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States are pursuing service integration that differs substantively and strategically 
from the first wave of service integration in the 1970s. This article describes the 
new approach, using Maryland's Systems Reform Initiative as an example, and 
identifies the ways in which it differs from the original wave. The most important 
substantive difference is that, in contrast to the first wave, which emphasized adminis- 
trative reforms, these new state initiatives include casework, governance, and financ- 
ing reforms as well. There are also differences in strategy. The early wave favored 
top-down initiatives, combined with limited bottom-up activities such as pilot proj- 
ects. The new wave, contrary to previous efforts, uses a "bootstrapping" approach, 
in which reform proceeds incrementally, local participants learn by doing, and the 
state learns by monitoring. 
Service integration is undergoing a renaissance. State initiatives to 
improve the coordination and delivery of services for children and 
families are part of a new wave of service integration that has been 
seen across the country over the past 10 years. This movement shows 
no signs of abating. In fact, given the current trend toward block 
grants and devolution of authority for social services to states and 
localities, such initiatives may become even more widespread. 
One aim of this article is to identify the ways in which the new wave 
of service integration differs from earlier efforts. These differences 
are both substantive and strategic: states are targeting casework, gover- 
nance, and fiscal reforms in addition to the traditional administrative 
reforms, and states are using a new "bootstrapping" strategy. A second 
aim of this article is to inform future efforts by drawing lessons from 
the experiences of states currently undertaking reforms. This article 
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follows one of the oldest and the most successful of the new state 
initiatives, Maryland's Systems Reform Initiative, from its inception in 
1989 until 1994. The principal sources for this analysis are a 1992 case 
study and a 1994 sequel,1 various reports and documents produced by 
the state of Maryland, and phone and in-person interviews with state, 
county, and local officials, community members, workers, and clients 
conducted in 1994 and updated in 1997. 
A Brief History of Service Integration 
Service integration as an organizing principle for the delivery of ser- 
vices is only 25 years old, yet its philosophical origins can be traced 
to the settlement houses of the late nineteenth century.2 One can also 
identify some elements of service integration in the 1960s, in programs 
established in conjunction with the War on Poverty.3 Neighborhood 
multiservice centers, for example, offered a range of services in 
community-based settings.4 Even Head Start, a categorically funded 
program, can be thought of as an early example of service integration 
in that it offered child care along with complementary services such 
as health care and nutrition. It was not until 1971, however, that Elliot 
Richardson, then secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), 
launched the first wave of coordinated efforts to integrate child and 
family services. The HEW services integration initiative aimed at "de- 
veloping an integrated framework within which ongoing programs 
can be rationalized and enriched to do a better job of making services 
available within the existing commitments and resources."5 Richard- 
son's goal was to reform what he called the "bureaucratic labyrinth."6 
At the federal level, there were more than 300 separate programs 
administered by HEW, and this proliferation of categorical programs 
extended to the state and local levels as well; a typical state had 100 
separate departments administering the federal programs, and a typi- 
cal city had some 500 different providers delivering the services.7 This 
fragmentation was particularly problematic because clients typically 
had multiple needs. By HEW's estimates, 85 percent of clients needed 
more than one service, yet, if referred to another provider for services, 
fewer than 20 percent would actually receive them.8 
To encourage states to reduce fragmentation and move toward 
greater integration of services, Richardson sponsored "top-down" and 
"bottom-up" reform.' Top-down reform from HEW's perspective con- 
sisted mainly of awarding planning grants. As implemented by the 
states, top-down reform most often consisted of executive office or 
agency reorganizations or planning initiatives; in fact, 29 states reorga- 
nized their state agencies as part of service integration initiatives in 
the 1970s or early 1980s. HEW's bottom-up reforms, which included 
Services Integration Targets of Opportunity (SITO) grants, gave states 
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and localities more autonomy and flexibility in using federal funds on 
the condition that they implemented reforms aimed at integrating 
services. Typically, these reforms occurred in selected local areas or 
programs on a pilot basis. 
The first wave of service integration was extensively studied. There 
were literally hundreds of studies of the state and local projects that 
were sponsored under the HEW service integration initiative. There 
were also several evaluations of the initiative as a whole, including an 
official HEW evaluation in 1972.10 The HEW evaluators looked at the 
extent to which localities had met the goal of "the linking together by 
various means of the services of two or more service providers to allow 
treatment of an individual's or family's needs in a more coordinated 
and comprehensive manner.""11 From studies of 30 local sites (and four 
states), the evaluators concluded that many of the ostensibly partici- 
pating communities had taken no, or only limited, concrete steps to 
implement this goal."2 As a result, they concluded, integration of ser- 
vices was "not extensive." 13 Other evaluators criticized the lack of 
outcome data."4 The overall consensus from these studies was that, 
although promising in theory, the first wave of reforms was disap- 
pointing in practice. Nor were other, related initiatives any more suc- 
cessful. Title XX, the Social Services Block Grant of 1975, which deca- 
tegorized funding for a variety of social services programs, was in 
theory another step in the direction of service integration.15 In prac- 
tice, however, the block grant had little effect because no new funds 
were allocated, and it proved difficult to take funds away from ex- 
isting programs.'6 
The extremely limited successes, and in some cases outright failures, 
of these early efforts did little, however, to tarnish the concept of 
service integration. Janet Weiss has argued in an influential essay that 
this was due to the potency of service integration as a symbol.17 Pulling 
services together into a comprehensive package is such a patently 
sensible concept that it is difficult to reject, even in the face of evidence 
to the contrary. Further, the evidence is not clear-cut because service 
integration was never really given a chance in those early, halfhearted 
efforts. Goals were often vaguely stated, and implementation was hap- 
hazard at best.'8 Another limitation was that the first wave emphasized 
administrative reforms, such as reorganizing state agencies or building 
links between local program administrators, instead of casework re- 
forms.'9 This is an important shortcoming. We would expect a priori 
that changes in casework practice should have a larger effect on street- 
level interactions between workers and clients than administrative re- 
forms, which might have, at best, an indirect effect on innovations in 
service delivery.20 
Given the spotty history of the first wave, it is not surprising that 
the current wave of service integration initiatives rarely invokes its 
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historical antecedents. Rather, service integration is commonly pre- 
sented as a new approach to the ever more complex needs of multi- 
problem families and to the ever-tightening constraints of limited fed- 
eral, state, and local budgets. In its new incarnation, service integration 
has taken hold very quickly. Beginning with a renaissance in the mid- 
to late-1980s, service integration is now at the forefront of reform 
efforts across the whole range of human services.21 In education, re- 
form efforts have centered on school-based or school-linked programs 
such as comprehensive youth service clinics.22 In child welfare, service 
integration initiatives have included decategorizing funding sources 
for child and family services, introducing family preservation models, 
and developing family support centers.23 In public welfare, in part 
spurred by the Family Support Act of 1988 but also by the search for 
administrative cost savings, virtually all the states have made some 
effort to introduce case management for welfare clients and to harmo- 
nize intake procedures across public assistance programs.24 
Some of the current service integration efforts look a great deal like 
the first wave of reform. A popular mechanism for reform, as in 
the first wave of service integration, is restructuring across agency 
boundaries. Colorado, for example, after extensive research and plan- 
ning, recently reorganized its state agency structure, combining three 
departments into a new Department of Human Services.25 This was 
not the sole focus of Colorado's initiative, but it was the major one.26 
Yet, as in the first wave of reform, a fundamental question remains: 
how much effect should we expect any administrative restructuring 
to have on street-level service delivery as experienced by individual 
children and families? 
Maryland is not alone in undertaking service integration efforts. In 
addition to the states mentioned above, several others have experi- 
mented with service integration in recent years, and efforts are under- 
way in Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Missouri, Oregon, and 
Vermont." Maryland is unique, however, in several respects. First, 
Maryland has been pursuing a service integration agenda since 1989. 
Thus, Maryland was one of the initiators in this wave of service integra- 
tion and offers the opportunity to study a state that is relatively far 
along in reform. Maryland is also unique in the scope of its initiative. 
Under the rubric of its Systems Reform Initiative, Maryland has aimed 
for statewide reforms across a range of service delivery systems, unlike 
other states, which have supported pilot projects only or have tackled 
only one or two service delivery systems. Maryland has also made the 
most progress in reforms other than the typical agency reorganiza- 
tions; it has pursued casework reforms as well as reforms in gover- 
nance and financing. Further, Maryland is unique in its strategic ap- 
proach to reform. It provides the best example of a state using a 
"bootstrapping" strategy of state-supported, locally coordinated re- 
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form, in contrast with the more traditional top-down strategy seen in 
states such as Colorado. 
What Are the Goals of the New Wave 
of Service Integration? 
Service integration (or services integration, as it is sometimes called) 
has been defined by Alfred Kahn and Sheila Kamerman as "a system- 
atic effort to solve problems of service fragmentation and of the lack 
of an exact match between an individual or family with problems and 
needs and an interventive program or professional specialty," with the 
goal of creating a "coherent and responsive human services system."28 
Thus, the problem to be remedied is not so much an overall lack of 
resources as it is a problem of fragmented, misallocated, and mis- 
matched resources. 
The basic premise of service integration is that individuals and fami- 
lies who have complex and multiple needs are not well served by a 
service delivery system that is specialized and categorical. Although 
scholars differ on the rationale for service integration, many would 
agree that the principal problems service integration initiatives seek 
to address are availability and efficiency.29 The availability problem 
concerns both access and coordination. Clients find that no one agency 
is concerned with the full range of their problems; professionals fre- 
quently do not attend to problems outside of their area of expertise 
and often offer little or no guidance in where a client might turn for 
help.'o Clients must act as their own case managers, piecing together 
a package of services that meet their multiple needs. 
Whether this is an undesirable model from the perspective of individ- 
uals and families is not immediately apparent. On the one hand, it 
allows clients, at least in principle, the choice of services and providers. 
It also affords clients a measure of privacy, as one provider need not 
know about the other services a client is receiving. The disadvantages, 
though, are likely greater. Shopping around for services places a heavy 
burden on already troubled individuals and families, and clients vary 
in their ability and willingness to use services." Those who need ser- 
vices the most might be least capable of being their own case manager 
and thus might fall through the cracks. Even clients who are well 
positioned to negotiate the system often trip up along the way due to 
conflicting eligibility requirements, lack of information, difficulties 
with transportation and child care, and so forth. 
The other impetus for reform, efficiency, stems from the concern 
that the mismatch between client needs and agency services may result 
in less effective service delivery and less efficient use of resources. In 
the face of a mismatch, an agency may offer a second-best solution, 
that is, an alternative service that is not exactly what the client needs 
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but that is the best that the agency currently has available. If a mother 
who needs substance abuse treatment is offered a parenting group 
instead, the problem is notjust that the client's addiction, which endan- 
gers her child, is going untreated. The problem is also that the agency 
is essentially wasting its resources. A natural solution would be for the 
agency either to offer substance abuse treatment itself or to ensure 
that its clients can get such treatment elsewhere. The waste problem 
becomes even more pressing when the second-best service (e.g., resi- 
dential treatment) costs more than the preferred but unavailable alter- 
native (community-based day treatment). This was an important impe- 
tus for reform in Maryland. 
The goals of service integration efforts are, first, to attain a better 
match between clients' needs and the services provided and, second, 
to create a more coordinated system for delivering those services. At- 
taining these goals requires both the capacity to identify individuals' 
and families' needs and the capacity to make adjustments to the service 
delivery system to meet those needs. At the state level, this means 
having a process to identify and adapt to changing needs. It also means 
removing barriers to integration and taking positive steps to facilitate 
integration, whether through integrating services in existing programs 
or coordinating services across programs. 
This process of needs assessment and planning need not occur at 
the state level. It could be done by a county or even a locality on behalf 
of the state. In fact, I would argue that some level of delegation to 
local actors must be used if the state is to improve the match between 
needs and the service delivery system. No matter how well informed 
the state, the locality is likely to be better positioned to identify its 
residents' needs. This means that, if states are to achieve a more exact 
match, they must allow much more flexibility in both planning and 
funding at the local level. In the same way, agencies that aim to im- 
prove the match between their services and their clients' needs must 
allow more discretion by individual workers, who are best positioned 
to ascertain individuals' and families' needs and to identify an array 
of services to meet those needs.32 
Three Dimensions of Service Integration 
As shown in table 1, service integration includes a broad range of 
activities.33 These can be usefully characterized along three dimen- 
sions: the type, level, and locus of reform.34 
The first dimension along which service integration efforts can vary 
is the type of reform. Scholarship on service integration traditionally 
makes a distinction between two types of activities: administrative and 
casework.35 Within the category of administrative reforms, however, 
one can further distinguish between traditional administrative reforms 
Table 1 
DIMENSIONS OF SERVICE INTEGRATION 
Reforms at the State, County, Reforms at the Program, Worker, 
Type and Locus of Reform or Local Level or Client Level 
Administrative reforms: 
Single agency: one department or point of Sole children and families department to Colocation of services, through agency mergers 
entry, in place of multiple agencies in oversee agencies, or single agency or "one-stop shopping" sites 
different locations 
Multiagency: enhanced collaboration among Interagency agreements, planning groups, or Case-by-case collaboration (e.g., information 
agencies that serve some of the same teams to handle problem cases sharing, service coordination, etc.) 
individuals and families 
Governance reforms: 
Single agency: devolution of authority to a Establish a local governing board, planning Individuals, families, and communities involved 
new entity for needs assessment, planning, team, or management board in service planning 
budgeting, accountability, etc. 
Multiagency: citizen involvement in each Establish citizen review boards, advisory Community members involved in service 
agency's operations but without shift in committees, or panels delivery; clients have a role in service 
authority to a single entity planning 
Financing reforms: 
Single agency: unified or pooled funding Sole children's or families' budget Discretionary funds available 
Multiagency: removal of fiscal barriers or use Decategorization, pooling funds, use of seed Flexible funding within and among agencies 
of financial incentives to reform. money or incentive funds 
Casework reforms: 
Single agency: generalist/family counselor Roles redefined, staff retrained and reassigned Worker fulfills multiple roles, provides most 
model services directly 
Multiagency: case management/service Staff training and guidance via policy and Case manager coordinates provision through 
coordination model procedures multiple service providers 
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(such as agency reorganizations) and more innovative governance and 
fiscal reforms. These distinctions are important, particularly when 
comparing the current wave of reform with the earlier one. As noted 
above, the first wave of service integration initiatives focused almost 
exclusively on administrative changes in the form of agency reorgani- 
zations. The current wave of reform efforts also places much emphasis 
on administrative reforms but may include governance and financing 
as well as agency restructuring. The current wave is also more likely 
to feature casework reforms. 
A second dimension of service integration is the level at which the 
reform is undertaken. As indicated in the table, reform can occur at 
the level of government (whether state, county, or local) or at the 
street level, with administrative reforms most often occurring at the 
level of government and casework reforms at the street level. This 
dimension is also important in comparing the current wave of reforms, 
which tend to focus more on the street level, with the reforms of 
the past, which more often emphasized changes within government 
whether at the state, county, or local level. 
A third dimension is the locus of reform, which may be a single 
agency or multiple agencies. Single-agency reforms focus on integ- 
rating services within agencies by, for example, merging departments, 
breaking down professional boundaries, creating ajoint planning pro- 
cess, and unifying funding streams. Multiagency reforms aim to inte- 
grate between agencies by, for example, building collaboration across 
departments, using case management models and teams to coordinate 
service delivery, and using funding mechanisms to promote better 
matches between clients and services. This distinction is also useful in 
comparing current and past waves of reform. The early wave empha- 
sized multiagency initiatives; the current wave focuses more attention 
on improving coordination within agencies. 
Barriers to Reform and Strategies for Reform 
Current service integration initiatives frequently encounter barriers 
to reform, as the first wave of reforms did in the past."6 An important 
barrier is fiscal and caseload pressure; although this pressure can pro- 
vide some of the impetus for reform, it also constrains reform. Also, 
as in the first wave, rhetoric by government leaders and policy makers 
about sweeping changes often exceeds the ability or willingness of 
localities to implement the changes. This is particularly problematic 
in states that use a top-down strategy. Political changes and uncertainty 
can cloud the vision and slow momentum. Another barrier is bureau- 
cratic inertia ("if we drag our heels, we can just wait for this new 
initiative to pass"). A final barrier is risk aversion, particularly in agen- 
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cies that deal with high-risk and highly visible populations (such as 
abused and neglected children) where the political costs of making a 
wrong move are very high. 
The above barriers are not unique to service integration reforms; 
they are obstacles to any attempts at statewide reforms. However, there 
are additional barriers that make service integration more difficult 
than other state-led reforms. One problem is that there are specific 
features of the existing child and family services system that make 
transition to a more integrated system difficult."7 These features in- 
clude categorical funding that encourages agencies to draw a sharp 
line between those they will serve and those they will not; the orienta- 
tion and training of professionals that lead them to believe that clients 
are best served by individual specialists rather than generalists; and 
"turfism," historical rivalries, and mistrust among agencies that now 
must collaborate. 
Another extremely important barrier is uncertainty. Despite the 
strong conceptual appeal of service integration, no one at the state 
level is entirely sure how the new models of casework, administrative 
structure, governance, and financing will work in practice or of how 
to get from here to there. How best to manage this uncertainty is a 
difficult question. A state that maintains that it has all the answers is 
bound to meet local resistance, while a state that encourages local 
input, as Maryland does, gains in terms of learning as it goes along 
but risks diminishing its credibility and authority. Although there are 
risks associated with being too rigid or too flexible about how an 
initiative should proceed, there nevertheless are advantages to being 
open to the possibility of change as an initiative moves forward. Robert 
Behn has called this process "management by groping along."38 State 
managers should be clear and firm about their overall agenda but 
should allow for flexibility in how that agenda will be achieved. This 
kind of "tight-loose" approach has (at least) two benefits. First, it per- 
mits and encourages frontline participants to share their insights and 
ideas for improving the initiative. Second, it gives planners the oppor- 
tunity to learn from local practitioners and to change strategy as 
needed. Another reason for allowing local feedback is that it will im- 
prove the chances for successful implementation.39 
Political scientists refer to the process of making corrections as one 
gains experience as "learning by doing." In a very interesting recent 
elaboration, Charles Sabel extends this analysis to what he calls "learn- 
ing by monitoring."40 Learning by monitoring is the process by which 
individuals not directly involved in implementation (such as planners, 
managers, or coordinators) make corrections based on their observa- 
tion of and interactions with local actors who have firsthand experience 
with the innovation. Learning by monitoring is characteristic of organi- 
472 Social Service Review 
zational entities that are supporting flexible, systemic reform when 
the goals are clear but the pathway to attain those goals is not. Sabel 
calls this type of reform "bootstrapping."41 
Although Sabel primarily describes bootstrapping reform in private- 
sector industrial settings seeking to introduce more flexible and team- 
oriented production methods, the parallels with service integration 
initiatives in the public services sector are striking. Sabel argues that 
providing flexibility and autonomy to local actors, including the oppor- 
tunity for them to influence the direction of the reforms through 
continuous monitoring and feedback, is beneficial not just because it 
is consistent with the nature of reform but also because it allows for 
learning by doing and learning by monitoring. This dual imperative 
applies to service integration as well. As noted earlier, if local service 
planners and caseworkers are to provide more integrated, flexible, and 
coordinated services, then they must be given more flexibility and 
autonomy. This will provide the opportunity for these local actors to 
learn by doing and to communicate their new knowledge to the state- 
wide planners, who will learn by monitoring and amend their plans 
accordingly. 
This bootstrapping strategy, where the state provides clear direction 
but also allows and learns from local flexibility, is evident in Maryland's 
Systems Reform Initiative, described below. This case also illustrates 
the multiple dimensions present in the current wave of service integra- 
tion as well as the barriers to reform. 
Maryland's Systems Reform Initiative 
Maryland's approach to integrating child and family services, which 
it calls "systems reform," is an incremental one. This incrementalism 
makes it easy for observers, and even participants, to underestimate 
the scope of what Maryland has been aiming to achieve. Another 
reason it is difficult to grasp the scope of the agenda is that Maryland 
has attempted reforms across a whole range of social services (e.g., 
family preservation, family support centers, and welfare reform). At 
first glance, this proliferation of reform programs can obscure the 
overall systems reform agenda. On closer examination, however, both 
the breadth of its agenda and its incremental approach to systems 
reform make Maryland a particularly interesting case. 
Maryland has been pioneering selected service integration models 
such as family centers and family preservation programs since the mid- 
1980s, with important support from the Annie E. Casey Foundation. 
However, its official service integration initiative dates from 1989. In 
May of that year, Governor William Donald Schaefer appointed Nancy 
Grasmick as his special secretary for children, youth, and families (she 
later became superintendent of education as well). He also established 
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a subcabinet for children and youth, made up of the commissioners 
of the agencies with responsibility for children and youth, and named 
Grasmick as its chair. In December 1989, Maryland was one of 10 
states selected to participate in a State Policy Academy on Families 
and Children at Risk sponsored by the Council of Governors' Policy 
Advisors.42 Shortly thereafter, Maryland was one of three Policy Acad- 
emy states chosen to receive Ford Foundation funding for its 
initiative.43 
Early in 1990, Grasmick hired a full-time director, Donna Stark, 
for Maryland's Children and Family Services Reform Initiative, later 
rechristened the Systems Reform Initiative (SRI). The initiative has 
three specific goals: to move authority for planning and purchasing 
services to the local community level (governance reform), to change 
the funding for services from categorical to pooled and from restricted 
to flexible (fiscal reform), and to reform service delivery to better 
reflect the principles of family preservation and family support, in 
particular, treating the family as a unit, viewing families as partners, 
and building on families' strengths (casework reform). It is striking 
that traditional administrative reforms such as agency reorganizations 
were not a prominent part of Maryland's agenda. Grasmick pursued 
administrative reform only as necessary to permit and support systemic 
change. For example, she fought for several years to establish a new 
unified department for families and children before eventually aban- 
doning it as politically unfeasible. 
Maryland approached service integration with a bootstrapping strat- 
egy designed to combine strong state leadership with significant local 
authority. To ensure that the localities were ready to assume this 
authority, Grasmick and Stark decided to introduce systems reform 
incrementally. Thus, although SRI would ultimately involve statewide 
and systemwide reforms, they started with only one county and a few 
services and then added more counties and services over time. The 
choice of the first county was an important one. Maryland was fortu- 
nate to have in Prince George's County a local community that already 
had experience both with the concept of service integration and with 
the philosophy of family preservation through its participation in the 
Annie E. Casey Foundation Child Welfare Reform Initiative. Starting 
with a county that was primed for success helped when the time came 
to expand to other counties, and by early 1994, Maryland was more 
than halfway there, with systems reform under way in 12 of its 24 
counties.44 
Maryland chose two services to kick off systems reform: community- 
based services to allow children to return from out-of-state placements, 
and family preservation services to prevent out-of-home placement. 
These choices fit in particularly well with Maryland's bootstrapping 
strategy of state-supported, locally coordinated reform. Bringing chil- 
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dren back from expensive out-of-state placements was bound to be 
popular with legislators and state agency officials since these children 
were among the most costly in the system. As these children returned, 
the savings enabled Maryland, despite tight budgets, to create a pool 
of flexible incentive funds, which became available to support the 
local communities in their efforts to coordinate the purchase of new 
preventive services. 
Family preservation services were also a good choice in launching 
the initiative. To the extent that system reform was about building 
local community capacity to plan and deliver services and to develop 
casework models with a family-focused philosophy, family preserva- 
tion, with its emphasis on community and family partnerships, was 
the right service to help local areas move forward with governance 
and casework reforms. 
The Systems Reform Initiative had mixed success in the legislature, 
and Maryland was unable to generate any substantial new funding for 
the initiative. Thus, political and fiscal pressures have hampered the 
reform effort. The initiative has also faced some of the barriers that 
typically impede service integration, although it is unclear that it has 
faced these head-on. For example, little attention has been paid to 
overcoming bureaucratic inertia by reaching staff within the state 
agencies and bringing them on board. Rather, the state's strategy 
appears to have been to bypass them by making changes at the top 
and at the level of the community. This is clearly a temporary solution, 
and in the next phase of reform, more attention will have to be paid 
to training staff within the state's child and family service agencies. A 
related barrier is resistance. At least one of the state agency heads is 
quite vocal about that agency's reluctance to participate in pooling 
funding, and it is unclear whether the initiative is dealing with that 
resistance. 
Maryland did meet head-on the "uncertainty" barrier, that is, the 
realization that the state does not necessarily have all the right answers 
about what will make its initiative succeed. In this regard, Maryland 
exemplifies bootstrapping reform. Local actors, both the street-level 
practitioners and the local management boards, have been given per- 
mission to experiment, and the state has demonstrated its willingness 
to "learn by monitoring," that is, to amend its plans based on feedback 
from these local actors. Maryland has also shown flexibility in the 
elements that compose its strategic plan. For example, creating a single 
children's agency was high on Maryland's agenda for several years but 
has now been dropped. 
The initiative's progress has been impressive. A 1992 report by the 
Council of Governors' Policy Advisors presented Maryland as the most 
advanced of the original 10 Policy Academy states, noting that "Mary- 
land has made great strides in realizing this vision of a seamless system 
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of services."45 Progress continued after 1992, as new counties and new 
services were brought on board. Five years into the initiative, in 1994, 
SRI was operating in half the state's counties, and several more were 
preparing to come on board."46 By the end of 1994, SRI was also 
reaching more parts of the service delivery system. Having begun 
with two specific populations (children in out-of-state placements and 
children at risk of placement), SRI was subsequently extended to other 
children and families as part of the process of "going to scale." 
Going to scale extends systems reform on all four dimensions. On 
the administrative and casework dimensions, going to scale means 
including in the initiative the full range of child and family services, 
although there is still resistance within the system to including some 
services (e.g., services to delinquent youth). On the governance and 
fiscal dimensions, going to scale means giving local management 
boards more control over the selection and purchase of services. For 
counties that go to scale, this means that a local management board 
will be responsible for identifying which services to purchase with the 
state child and family services funds and from whom. The plan as 
of 1994 was that existing state agency service provision would be 
"grandfathered" for a period of several years, but after that, local 
management boards will be free to purchase services from whomever 
they think best (i.e., a local area might continue to buy child protective 
services investigations from the state child protective agency or might 
switch to a community agency, depending on local needs and local 
capacity).47 
Evaluating the Success of Maryland's Initiative 
To evaluate the success of a reform initiative in accomplishing service 
integration, it is important to determine not only whether specific 
goals were achieved but also whether outcomes can, with some fairly 
high degree of certainty, be attributed to the initiative. In Maryland, 
as is often the case, it is difficult to do this, but the results are suggestive. 
An early, and important, component of Maryland's reform agenda 
was to return children from unnecessary and expensive out-of-state 
placements to alternative programs in the community; it also aimed 
to prevent such placements in the future. On the face of it, evaluating 
success on this component is straightforward. One can simply count 
the number of children returned from out-of-state placement, the 
number of children entering such placement, and the number of dol- 
lars saved. On each of these measures, Maryland has made progress, 
as documented in a 1994 status report.48 Between 1990 and 1993, the 
numbers of children returning from out-of-state placement increased 
by nearly one-third, from 205 to 271. Over the same time period, the 
number of children entering out-of-state placements fell by 44 per- 
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cent, from 310 to 174. In 1993 alone, the increase in returns and 
reduction in entries freed up over $4 million, which was given to the 
counties so that they could purchase new community-based services. 
These figures do not tell us conclusively that SRI caused the progress. 
Favorable demographic trends, falls in caseloads, and so forth, might 
have played a role. However, the figures are suggestive. 
The difficulty in evaluating success becomes even more apparent 
when examining Maryland's other initial systems reform goal: pre- 
venting unnecessary out-of-home placements. The family counselors 
and families whom I interviewed in Maryland reported that the family 
preservation services offered under systems reform had played a key 
role in keeping families together. For example, an adolescent girl and 
her grandparents in Prince George's County said that, if not for the 
intervention of their family counselor, the girl would have been placed 
in foster care, as she had been in the past, due to the family's inability 
to negotiate issues such as curfews and after-school activities. This 
family also credited their family counselor with helping the girl stay 
in school because, when the school threatened to expel her due to her 
difficult behavior, the counselor accompanied the family to the school 
and helped arrange for the girl to continue attending school on a 
reduced schedule. The counselor also helped set up individual thera- 
pists for the girl and her grandmother. Once these supports were in 
place, the counselor closed the case, although he remained available 
to the family in case of emergency. According the family, however, 
they rarely had to contact him because he had helped them learn ways 
to cope with crises on their own. In another case, in Baltimore City, 
a mother with six children was referred to family preservation services 
because she was living in dangerous and inadequate housing. The 
children had been in foster care before, and the child welfare agency 
was contemplating placing them again. Instead, the family counselor 
helped the family find a new apartment and, using the family preserva- 
tion agency's flexible funds, paid the costs for moving and for a refrig- 
erator. Once the housing crisis was solved, the counselor and the 
mother worked together on other pressing issues, such helping the 
mother to arrange a test for the HIV virus and to set up therapy 
for her depression. The family counselor also used his own family 
connections to help the oldest child get a job after school. When I met 
the family and the counselor a year later, they were still in touch 
periodically, although the case was officially closed, and the mother 
credited the counselor with having saved her children from going 
back into foster care. 
Reports such as these are encouraging, but, as the literature on 
the evaluation of family preservation programs attests, it is extremely 
difficult to establish the extent to which an intensive family interven- 
tion program actually prevents placements.49 Ideally, one would want 
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a controlled experiment, in which comparable families were randomly 
assigned to either the treatment (in this case, family preservation) or 
the control (regular child welfare services) group, but Maryland did 
not undertake this type of experiment. Lacking an experimental 
framework, it is difficult to interpret the fact that only 16 percent of 
the children served in family preservation programs were placed into 
out-of-home care because we do not know what percentage would 
have been placed without the reform initiative.'o One possible ap- 
proach is to compare data on the numbers of children entering foster 
care in counties with family preservation programs versus those with- 
out such programs. This approach has some intuitive appeal because, 
if a family preservation program is working, the number of foster 
children in that area relative to other areas without such a program 
should decrease. Maryland provides data that allow for a comparison 
of Prince George's County, the flagship county, with the rest of the 
state from fiscal year 1989 to fiscal year 1993. Out-of-home placements 
by the child welfare agency, the Department of Human Resources 
(DHR), fell by 38 percent (from 523 in 1989 to 324 in 1993) in Prince 
George's County at a time when DHR out-of-home placement rates 
were essentially stable (2,690 and 2,696) in the remainder of the state. 
Between 1991-93, placements by all state agencies fell by 19 percent 
in Prince George's County (from 837 to 676) while increasing 3 percent 
(from 5,309 to 5,466) in the remainder of the state. Eight other count- 
ies began participating 1 year after Prince George's County did, and 
it is clear from the data that these eight other participating counties 
have done less well. From 1991-93, while overall placements were 
decreasing 19 percent in Prince George's County, placements across 
the eight other participating counties increased 5 percent, comparable 
to (in fact, slightly worse than) the constant level of placements in the 
nonparticipating counties. Much of the increase was driven by the 
increase in the placement of delinquent youth in the largest partici- 
pating county, Baltimore City, which offset the decrease in child wel- 
fare placements in that county and the others. 
One might ask, however, whether the rest of the state is the right 
control group. Participation in systems reform, after all, was not on a 
random basis; rather, the counties that were best positioned and most 
willing participated first. The lower foster care numbers in Prince 
George's County, for example, might be due to characteristics of that 
county that have little to do with SRI. A second concern is controlling 
for other changes that occur in the counties over time. Changes unre- 
lated to SRI, such as the increase in juvenile crime in Baltimore City 
in the early 1990s or the more recent increase in child abuse and 
neglect reports in Prince George's County, might affect the number 
of placements in some counties more than others.51 To control for 
some of this heterogeneity across counties, one ideally would use statis- 
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tics on levels and changes in levels of child abuse and neglect referrals 
or delinquency referrals to estimate a county's foster care or juvenile 
detention placement rate as a percentage of all children at risk of 
placement (rather than simply counting the number of placements). 
Postscript: Systems Reform after 1994 
In the fall of 1994, Maryland elected a new governor, Parris Glenden- 
ing, the former county executive from Prince George's County. Gover- 
nor Glendening appointed a new special secretary for children, youth, 
and families in early 1995. Nancy Grasmick continued as the superin- 
tendent of education but no longer had responsibility for leading the 
systems reform effort. Although the new governor and secretary were 
supportive, systems reform foundered in that transition year. In early 
1996, responding to concerns about the state of the initiative voiced 
by legislators, state administrators, and local participants, Governor 
Glendening established a systems reform task force, chaired by Lieu- 
tenant Governor Kathleen Kennedy Townsend. The task force's re- 
port, issued in November 1996, reaffirmed the commitment of the 
legislature, state executive, and counties to the principles of systems 
reform.52 The task force report also identified mechanisms for tracking 
results and accountability, and set out a strategy for moving the change 
effort forward. As a result, a new Systems Reform Commission with 
legislative, state, and county representation was established to direct 
the initiative. The commission's plans as of 1997 included bringing 
the nine remaining counties on board by the end of the year and 
supporting some of the original counties in taking the vision to scale. 
The task force also recommended strengthening the authority of the 
local management boards to set their own agendas for systems reform 
and to monitor outcomes for their counties. 
Thus, although system reform stalled for a few years during the 
transition to a new administration, the effort is now back on track. 
The ability of SRI to weather the change seems to have occurred in 
large part because key participants from the executive, legislative, and 
local levels were familiar with and committed to the principles of 
systems reform. Although frustrated with the current status of systems 
reform, none of these key players is advocating turning back. 
Conclusion 
The reform initiative in Maryland is at the forefront of a new wave 
of service integration efforts being undertaken in states and localities 
across the country. The Maryland initiative sheds some light on the 
questions of whether this new wave of service integration reforms can 
be more successful than the earlier wave and, if so, how. There are 
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three particularly striking findings that emerge from the analysis of 
this state's experience. 
One lesson is that the distinction between administrative, casework, 
governance, and fiscal reforms matters. While state planners may per- 
ceive that agency reorganizations and other administrative reforms 
are equally, if not more, important, Maryland's experience seems to 
indicate that, in fact, casework, governance, and fiscal reforms are the 
critical ones. Maryland, after all, failed in its efforts at administrative 
reforms, but its initiative has nevertheless been markedly more success- 
ful than traditional reforms that focus on administrative restructuring. 
This suggests that the current wave of service integration initiatives, 
unlike the first wave of the 1970s, is making more than a symbolic 
difference. As Mary Jo Bane has noted, the real measure of success 
of service integration reforms is whether they have made any differ- 
ence in the lives of individual children and families by changing the 
service delivery within existing organizations or by creating new types 
of programs that better meet the needs of children and families."5 On 
this measure, the reforms in Maryland have to be rated a qualified 
success. New programs that are more responsive to families' needs, 
such as family centers and family preservation services, have been 
established, and new operating procedures that allow workers more 
discretion, such as discretionary funds, have been implemented. The 
reforms, however limited, are real and are spreading. Although some 
resistance is evident, particularly within the traditional state agencies, 
it is also evident from the case study, reports, and interviews that there 
are many individuals and agencies who are committed to the principles 
of service integration and are actively espousing the reforms. There 
is substance, then, to this current wave, and this in large part appears 
to be due to the emphasis on casework, fiscal, and governance reforms 
rather than the traditional administrative ones. 
A second lesson is that local program innovations can be extremely 
helpful in advancing a reform agenda, but that they also have limita- 
tions. Among local program innovations, family centers and family 
preservation programs have particular advantages. These program 
models deliver comprehensive family-focused services, benefiting fam- 
ilies and demonstrating the value of service integration. Local policy 
teams are useful models as well. They involve local actors in a joint 
planning and service delivery process, breaking down barriers between 
agencies and helping to resolve old battles over turf and budgets. 
Another advantage of local policy teams is that they reinforce the 
notion that statewide planners may not have all the answers and that 
reform initiatives can benefit from learning by monitoring. The princi- 
pal limitation of these local program innovations is that they may not 
necessarily affect operations within the existing service delivery system. 
It is not clear that the family support centers and family preservation 
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programs in Maryland have had any effect on the state's child welfare 
agency. This is an important limitation because the majority of chil- 
dren and families continue to be served by the existing service deliv- 
ery system. 
Third, it now appears that, in order for service integration initiatives 
to make a difference at the street level, local actors will have to be given 
a greater degree of autonomy than has previously been envisioned. If 
services are to be truly responsive to the needs of individuals, families, 
and communities, these stakeholders must have input into decisions 
on what services are to be provided and how. Maryland learned this 
lesson, and citizen input is an important part of its reform agenda. 
This does not mean that there is no longer a role for state governments 
in service integration initiatives. On the contrary, state leadership is 
essential to facilitate and sponsor change, and states that wish to pursue 
service integration must continue to play a major role in initial plan- 
ning, providing incentive funding and technical assistance, and draft- 
ing and sponsoring legislation, among other things. It does mean that 
states will be most effective in these efforts if they view themselves as 
acting in partnership with and learning from the localities, in a process 
of bootstrapping reform. It is interesting in this regard that in estab- 
lishing its new commission to direct systems reform in 1997, Maryland 
moved the leadership of the initiative from a subcabinet group to a 
commission where 50 percent of the representation is from the local 
areas. At the same time, it moved to enhance the authority of the local 
management boards, which was one of the key recommendations of 
the 1996 task force.54 
The Maryland Systems Reform Initiative provides some evidence 
that the new wave of service integration initiatives, unlike the earlier 
wave, can lead to changes that benefit children and families. The 
Maryland case provides some insights into how to get from here to 
there, but it also leaves intriguing questions unanswered. Further re- 
search is needed on bootstrapping reform and on the necessary condi- 
tions for state and local actors to work together to implement changes 
in governance and financing and to effect casework reforms within 
existing state agencies. 
Notes 
I am grateful to Mary Jo Bane, Linda Kaboolian, Mark Moore, Jack Needleman, 
Charles Sabel, and Teresa Eckrich Sommer for helpful comments and discussions. 
Funding for this project was provided by the Ford Foundation. The opinions expressed 
here are mine alone. 
1. Kirsten Lundberg, "Integrating Family Services: Maryland" (Case C-16-91-1084.0 
and Sequel C-16-91-1084. 1, Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government Case 
Program, Cambridge, Mass., 1994). 
2. For detailed histories of service integration, see Sharon Lynn Kagan, Integrating 
Human Services: Understanding the Past to Shape the Future (New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
Service Integration 481 
University Press, 1994); Alfred Kahn and Sheila Kamerman, Integrating Services Integra- 
tion: An Overview of Initiatives, Issues, and Possibilities (New York: Columbia University 
School of Public Health, National Center for Children in Poverty, 1992). 
3. Robert Halpern, "Supportive Services for Families in Poverty: Dilemmas of Re- 
form," Social Service Review 65, no. 3 (1991): 343-64. 
4. Sheldon Gans and Gerald Horton, Integration of Human Services (New York: 
Praeger, 1975). 
5. "Services Integration-Next Steps," Secretarial Memorandum, June 1, 1971, p. 
1, cited in U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Integration of Human 
Services in HEW: An Evaluation of Services Integration Projects, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1976). The HEW initiative used 
the term "services integration," and this term was used throughout the 1970s and even 
in some later literature. This has been replaced by "service integration" in the more 
recent literature. For this reason, I use "service integration" in this article except when 
referring specifically to the HEW initiative. 
6. Elliot Richardson, Responsibility and Responsiveness: A Report on the HEW Potential 
for the Seventies (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
1973), p. 42. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid., p. 43. 
9. Ibid., p. 55. 
10. The official HEW evaluation was initially released as U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, Integration of Human Services in HEW: An Evaluation of Services 
Integration Projects (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Wel- 
fare, 1972); see also Gans and Horton (n. 4 above). An earlier HEW evaluation was 
conducted in 1971; see Sidney Gardner, Services Integration in HEW: An Initial Report 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1971). Other 
evaluations include Abt Associates, Services Integration, Part II, Integrating Linkages (Cam- 
bridge, Mass.: Abt Associates, 1971); the Human Ecology Institute, Human Service Devel- 
opment Programs in Sixteen Allied Services (SITO) Projects (Wellesley, Mass.: Human Ecology 
Institute, 1975); and William Lucas, Aggregating Organizational Experience with Services 
Integration: Feasibility and Design (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1975). Robert Agranoff 
and Alex Pattakos, Dimensions of Services Integration: Service Delivery, Program Linkages, 
Policy Management, Organizational Structure (Washington, D.C.: Project SHARE, 1979), 
provide an overview of the SITO initiatives. Laurence Lynn, The State and Human 
Services: Organizational Change in a Political Context (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980), 
provides case studies and analysis of six state-level initiatives. Neil Gilbert and Harry 
Specht, Coordinating Social Services: An Analysis of Community, Organizational, and Staff 
Characteristics (New York: Praeger, 1977), provide an analysis of service integration in 
the Model Cities Program. For a listing of papers and publications about individual 
service integration projects undertaken in the 1970s, see Project SHARE, The Project 
Share Collection (Rockville, Md.: Project SHARE, 1979); see also Project SHARE, Services 
Integration Methodology (Rockville, Md.: Project SHARE, 1979). 
11. U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Integration of Human Services 
in HEW, 1972 (n. 10 above), p. 5. 
12. Kagan (n. 2 above). 
13. U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Integration of Human Services 
in HEW, 1972 (n. 10 above), p. 16. 
14. Lucas (n. 10 above). 
15. Kahn and Kamerman (n. 2 above). 
16. Mary Jo Bane and Susan Lusi, "The Federal Role in Improving Services" (Work- 
ing Paper no. ES-91-2, Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government, Malcolm 
Wiener Center for Social Policy, 1991). 
17. Janet Weiss, "Substance versus Symbol in Administrative Reform," Policy Analysis 
(Winter 1981): 20-45. 
18. Gans and Horton (n. 4 above). 
19. Robert Agranoff, "Human Services Integration: Past and Present Challenges in 
Public Administration," Public Administration Review 51, no. 6 (1991): 533-42; David 
Austin, "Administrative Issues in Improving the Provision of Human Services," in 
Human Services Coordination, ed. Harold Orlans (New York: Pica, 1982). 
482 Social Service Review 
20. Charles Bruner, "Is Change from Above Possible? State-Level Strategies for 
Supporting Street-Level Services" (Working Paper no. ES-91-6, Harvard University, 
Kennedy School of Government, Malcolm Wiener Center for Social Policy, 1991); Mary 
Jo Bane, "Integrating Family Services: The State Role" (report to the Ford Foundation, 
Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government, Malcolm Wiener Center for Social 
Policy, 1992). 
21. Kahn and Kamerman (n. 2 above). 
22. Gerry Martin, A Joint Enterprise with America's Families to Assure School Success 
(Washington, D.C.: Council of State School Officers, 1993). California and New Jersey 
are particularly prominent examples. See, e.g., Kagan (n. 2 above); Larry Best, "Institu- 
tions Which Promote Social Services Integration: An Analysis of Top-Down vs. Bottom- 
Up Approaches" (paper presented at the Association for Public Policy Analysis and 
Management, Washington, D.C., 1995). 
23. Charles Bruner and D. Flintrop, Developing Comprehensive Family Centered Child 
Welfare Systems: Emerging State Strategies (Des Moines, Iowa: Child and Family Policy 
Center, 1991); Jill Kinney, David Haapala, and Charlotte Booth, Keeping Families To- 
gether: The Homebuilders Model (Hawthorne: Aldine de Gruyter, 1991); Carol Dunst, 
Carol Trivette, and Angela Deal, eds., Supporting and Strengthening Families (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Brookline Books, 1994). 
24. Olivia Golden, Poor Children and Welfare Reform (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 
1992); Allen Kraus and Jolie Bain Pillsbury, "Streamlining Intake and Eligibility Sys- 
tems: A Review of the Practice and the Possible" (New York: Center for Assessment 
and Policy Development, 1993). Service integration is also an important element of 
welfare reform initiatives in states such as Michigan and Iowa that have adopted a case 
management approach to moving recipients from welfare to work. 
25. Kirsten Lundberg, "Integrating Family Services: Colorado" (Case C-16-91-1082.0 
and Sequel C-16-91-1082.1, Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government Case 
Program, Cambridge, Mass., 1994); Jane Waldfogel, "Integrating Child and Family 
Services: Lessons from Arkansas, Colorado, and Maryland" (report to the Ford Founda- 
tion, Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government, Malcolm Wiener Center for 
Social Policy, 1994). 
26. Lundberg (n. 25 above); Waldfogel (n. 25 above). 
27. Jane Knitzer and Stephen Page, Mapping and Tracking State Initiatives to Meet 
the Needs of Young Children and Families (New York: National Center for Children in 
Poverty, 1996). 
28. Kahn and Kamerman (n. 2 above), p. 5. 
29. Kagan (n. 2 above); Gans and Horton (n. 4 above). 
30. Lisbeth Schorr, Within Our Reach: Breaking the Cycle of Disadvantage (New York: 
Doubleday, 1989). 
31. Teresa Eckrich Sommer, "Low-Income Families as Customers of the Social Ser- 
vice System: Implications for Practice and System Reform" (Ph.D. diss., Kennedy School 
of Government, Harvard University, 1995). 
32. See, e.g., Schorr, Within Our Reach (n. 30 above). 
33. For a comprehensive listing of service integration activities, see Olivia Golden 
"Collaboration as a Means, Not an End," in Lisbeth Schorr, ed., Effective Services for 
Young Children (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Books on Demand, 1991); Kagan (n. 2 above); Kahn 
and Kamerman (n. 2 above). 
34. I am using dimension in a different sense than Agranoff and Pattakos (see n. 10 
above). Their four dimensions (service delivery, program linkages, policy management, 
and organizational structure) refer to components of service integration efforts, whereas 
the three dimensions used here (type, level, and locus of reform) refer to characteristics. 
35. Agranoff (n. 19 above); Gans and Horton (n. 4 above); Kagan (n. 2 above); Kahn 
and Kamerman (n. 2 above); F. Stevens Redburn, "On Human Services Integration," 
Public Administration Review 37 (1977): 264-69. 
36. Orlans, ed. (n. 19 above); Kagan (n. 2 above). 
37. See Frank Farrow and Tom Joe, "Financing School-Linked, Integrated Services," 
Future of Children 2, no. 1 (1992): 56-67. Kagan (n. 2 above). 
38. Robert Behn, "Management by Groping Along," Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 7, no. 4 (1988): 643-63, and Leadership Counts: Lessons for Public Managers 
Service Integration 483 
from the Massachusetts Welfare, Training, and Employment Program (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1991); Olivia Golden, "Innovation in Public Sector Human 
Services Programs: The Implications of Innovation by 'Groping Along,"' Journal of 
Policy Analysis and Management 9, no. 2 (1990): 219-48. 
39. See Richard Elmore, "Backward Mapping: Implementation Research and Policy 
Decisions," Political Science Quarterly 94, no. 4 (Winter 1979-80): 601-18. 
40. Charles Sabel, "Learning by Monitoring," in The Handbook of Economic Sociology, 
ed. Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1994). On the related concept of "learning organizations," see Sid Gardner, "Aft- 
erword," in The Politics of Linking Schools and Social Services, ed. Louise Adler and Sid 
Gardner (Washington, D.C.: Falmer, 1994). 
41. Charles Sabel, "Bootstrapping Reform: Rebuilding Firms, the Welfare State, and 
Unions" (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1994). 
42. Ten states (Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, New York, North Dakota, 
Oregon, Texas, and Washington) participated in this academy, which focused on support- 
ing state efforts to integrate child and family services. Seven additional states (Arizona, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Nevada, Ohio, and Oklahoma) participated in a second academy 
held in 1991 and 1992. The progress of the states participating in the first academy is 
documented in Judith Chynoweth, Lauren Cook, Michael Campbell, and Barbara Dyer, 
Experiments in Systems Change: Stated Implement Family Policy (Washington, D.C.: Council of 
Governors' Policy Advisors, 1992). For a report on the second academy, see Kathryn 
Nelson, Susan Foster, and Joseph Cocozza, Voices from the Field: Lessons from the Family 
Academy (Washington, D.C.: Council of Governors' Policy Academy, 1994). 
43. The other two states were Arkansas and Colorado. For a comparative study of 
the three states, see Waldfogel (n. 25 above). 
44. Three more counties formally joined the initiative between 1994 and 1996. The 
other nine counties were due to come on board by the end of 1997. See State of 
Maryland Subcabinet for Children, Youth, and Families, "Systems Reform Status of 
Local Management Boards as of January 1997" (Baltimore: State of Maryland Subcabi- 
net for Children, Youth, and Families, 1997). 
45. The report found that three other states (Colorado, Texas, and Washington) had 
made significant changes; five (Arkansas, Oregon, Iowa, New York, and North Dakota) 
had made little or no progress; and one (Illinois) had abandoned the initiative. See 
Chynoweth et al. (n. 42 above). 
46. As of January 1997, systems reform was fully operational in all but nine counties. 
Six of these had already established local management boards, and all nine were to 
begin implementation in July. See State of Maryland Subcabinet for Children, Youth, 
and Families, "Systems Reform Status of Local Management Boards" (n. 44 above), and 
"Subcabinet for Children, Youth, and Families and Systems Reform Initiative: Initiatives 
and FY 1996 Accomplishments" (Baltimore: State of Maryland Subcabinet for Children, 
Youth, and Families, 1997). 
47. As of 1997, no counties had yet gone to scale, but the state and counties were 
continuing to move in that direction, with three counties identified as "vision to scale" 
pilot areas. The new Systems Reform Commission has a "vision to scale" subcommittee 
that will work with the counties that want to go to scale. See Governor's Task Force on 
Children, Youth, and Families Systems Reform, Final Report of the Governor's Task Force 
on Children, Youth, and Families Systems Reform (Baltimore: Governor's Task Force on 
Children, Youth, and Families Systems Reform, 1996). 
48. State of Maryland Subcabinet for Children, Youth and Families, Status of Systems 
Reform: Fiscal Year 1993 (Baltimore: State of Maryland Subcabinet for Children, Youth 
and Families, 1994). Unless otherwise noted, all statistics from this report refer to fiscal 
year data. 
49. John Schuerman, Tina Rzepnicki, and Julia Littell, Putting Families First: An 
Experiment in Family Preservation (Hawthorne, N.Y.: Aldine de Gruyter, 1994); Peter 
Rossi, "Assessing Family Preservation Programs," Children and Youth Services Review 14, 
no. 2 (1992: 77-97, "Strategies for Evaluation," Children and Youth Services Review 14, 
no. 2 (1992): 167-91. 
50. State of Maryland Subcabinet for Children, Youth and Families, "Systems Reform 
Status of Local Management Boards" (n. 44 above). 
484 Social Service Review 
51. Ibid.; State of Maryland Department of Human Resources, Monthly Management 
Report: April 1994 (Baltimore: State of Maryland Department of Human Resources, 
1994). 
52. See Governor's Task Force on Children, Youth, and Families Systems Reform 
(n. 47 above). 
53. Bane (n. 20 above). 
54. See Governor's Task Force on Children, Youth, and Families Systems Reform 
(n. 47 above). 
